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Abstract 
Despite the far-reaching liberalization of the French banking system over the past 
quarter century, French banks suffered far less in the international financial crisis 
(2007-09) than banks in the United Kingdom and Germany. However, the French 
system also suffered far more – at least in the first stages of the crisis – than the 
banking systems of Southern Europe. By several measures, French banks were world 
leaders in financial innovation and the French banking system was highly exposed to 
international market movements. The limited impact of the crisis, however, owed to 
the specificities of French ‘market-based banking’. Deliberate state action over the 
two decades prior to the crisis created a specific kind of banking system and 
encouraged forms of financial innovation, the unintentional consequence of which 
was the limited exposure to the securitization that caused the damage wrought during 
the financial crisis. 
 
Introduction 
French banks and their representative associations explain the comparative stability of 
the French banking system during the international financial crisis (2007-09) in terms 
of a ‘balanced business model’ with both a strong retail base and a full range of 
investment banking activities (Lee 2010; Pauget 2009; Ministry of Finance officials 
20 October 2010). This article explains this ‘balanced business model’ as the product 
of French state disengagement from the financial sector since the mid-1980s but also 
continued state intervention. The specificities of this intervention involved the 
creation of national banking champions, cross-shareholding networks of companies 
centred around banks, a closed banking system with only limited foreign presence due 
to both de facto protectionism and a legislated bias towards retail for some of the 
mutual banks. State intervention resulted in a highly consolidated, saturated 
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competitive retail banking sector. The French state also deliberately – and very 
successfully – encouraged specific forms of financial innovation, notably derivatives. 
The unintended consequence of state action was that French banks downplayed 
securitization and the purchase of securitized products, thus limiting the impact of a 
crisis connected in large part to financial innovation. The state was less successful in 
its repeated efforts to facilitate securitization. Banks themselves were agents of 
change, notably through their efforts to expand in the context of sluggish domestic 
economic growth and a saturated domestic retail market. French banks engaged 
increasingly in ‘market-based banking’ activities and expanded their retail operations 
abroad. The focus of this analysis parallels that of Mary O’Sullivan (2007) which 
emphasises the French state’s role in directing financial market reform but also 
highlights the post-liberalization role of economic actors in shaping the financial 
system. However, the focus here is on how the intended and less deliberate effects of 
state action shaped the features of French banking that can be described as systemic 
which, in turn, buffered French banks from the full impact of the financial crisis. 
 
John Zysman’s (1983) analysis of France as the best example of a state-led credit-
based financial system provides little guidance as to the French variety of financial 
capitalism today. However, the footprint of the state, through a directed and 
incomplete liberalization, has created a specific kind of financial system, the intended 
and unintended features of which have been revealed in the impact of the international 
financial crisis on the system since 2007. The argument of this paper thus builds upon 
the CPE literature that stresses the transformation of French capitalism away from a 
state-led model yet struggles to categorise France in the Liberal Market Economy 
(LME) / Coordinated Market Economy (CME) dichotomy of the Varieties of 
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Capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall and Soskice 2001; Culpepper 2008) or depicts it as a 
unique hybrid form (Boyer 1997; Hancké 2001).1 The argument here about the 
development of the French banking system also aligns with the conclusions reached 
by Vivien Schmidt (2003, 2009) who describes France as a state-enhanced / state-
influenced form of capitalism. However, the claim of an important legacy of state 
intervention does not suggest, let alone prove, continued state intervention, even of a 
more modest kind.   
 
Similarly, France’s financial system cannot be easily categorised. It contains features 
of the liberalized, deregulated and more capital market-based British system but also 
features of the more protected, regulated and bank credit-based financial systems of 
Southern Europe and Germany. In Zysman’s (1983) depiction of the French financial 
system as ‘state-led credit-based’, the French state directed finance through state 
owned banks in the Circuit du Trésor system (see also Loriaux 1991). Despite 
liberalization and the privatization of most of the large French banks from the mid-
1980s, studies from the mid-1990s continued to assign a central importance to the 
state in the context of a ‘financial network economy’ (Story and Walter 1997; 
Underhill 1997). This description was already being challenged (Morin 1998; 2000) 
and had become less valid by the early 2000s. Yet France remained difficult to situate 
in terms of the credit-based / capital-based dichotomy, with Andreas Hackethal (2000, 
13) describing the French financial system as a ‘special case which seems hard to 
classify’. 
 
Indeed, snap shots of the French financial system tell us very different stories if we 
look at non-financial company (NFC) external finance or total financial system assets 
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– two typical measures used to categorise financial systems. French NFC external 
finance moved from heavy reliance on bank lending prior to the 1990s to heavy 
reliance on equity finance by 2000 (Table 1). The French financial system had, by this 
important measure, become more ‘Anglo-Saxon’ than the United Kingdom (UK) by 
the late 1990s (80 versus 70 per cent equity in 2000). 
 
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
 
However, if we look at total financial assets (which is standard for categorising 
financial systems, see Allen and Gale 2000) banks continued to dominate the French 
financial system. Bank assets increased significantly rising to 334.8 per cent of GDP 
in 2007 (up from 140 per cent in 1993). The French banking system was one of 
Europe’s largest, and broadly similar in size to Germany’s despite the smaller French 
economy. In terms of bank assets to GDP, France’s banking system was only 
somewhat smaller than the UK’s (399.7 in 2007) and considerably bigger than 
Germany’s (195.5 per cent).2 Equity market capitalization also increased significantly 
in real terms reaching a peak of 105.5 per cent of GDP in 2007 (up from 36 per cent 
in 1993).3 However, the importance of bank assets increased as a percentage of total 
French financial assets, which paralleled the trend in most advanced industrial 
economies (Figure 1).   
 
France thus might be best described as having an ‘equity-dependent but still largely 
bank-based financial system’ an apparent contradiction explained largely in terms of 
the limited position of domestic lending in total bank assets (Figure 2). Yet in the 
2000s, bank lending rose in real and relative importance as a source of finance for 
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NFCs in relation to equity issuance and securities (Table 2), paralleling developments 
in several advanced industrialised economies, including the US and UK (Hardie and 
Maxfield 2011). Contradicting previous trends and expectations, this largely reflected 
the end of big privatization programmes, bear equity markets and low real interest 
rates. As will be shown below, ‘market-based banking’ also contributed to the real 
and relative rise in bank lending. 
 
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
<FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Before proceeding, it is helpful to explain the concept market-based banking as used 
in this paper and its significance in terms of how we should understand financial 
systems. The concept encompasses a variety of new types of banking business – 
rather than the ‘traditional’ banking of deposit taking and lending – that burgeoned in 
the two decades leading up to the crisis (Hardie and Howarth 2011). It includes the 
trading of a range of derivatives – equity, interest, exchange rate and credit. The latter 
involves selling loans rather than keeping them on the banks’ books as traditionally 
done. Securitization is part of this process, meaning that the loans are pooled and then 
re-divided into a new financial product containing ‘pieces’ of many different loans. A 
second new type of business is ‘selling’ loans, not just to any other institution through 
the market, but also to arms-length but related ‘special purpose entities’ or ‘structured 
investment vehicles’ (SIVs). This type of business also sometimes involves trying to 
protect against the risks involved by buying or selling credit default swaps (CDSs). 
Both securitization and hiding risk through CDSs were also involved in a third type of 
new business: holding loans on the books but using them as collateral to borrow 
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several times the value of the loans. These are the main activities behind what is 
called ‘wholesale’ financing. The rise of market-based banking undermines the 
distinction between bank credit-based and capital market-based financial systems, in 
that the provision of bank credit becomes more closely linked to the market. Through 
an examination of the different features of market-based banking, Hardie and 
Howarth (2011, 2013) develop a matrix that provides a more nuanced understanding 
of national financial systems. Challenging the dichotomous description of national 
financial systems also potentially undermines distinctive features of CMEs and LMEs, 
with the decline of ‘patient capital’ in the former and the increased reliance on 
banking and bank lending in the latter. 
 
The significant but comparatively limited impact of the crisis on France 
 
Total French bank losses in the aftermath of the 2007-09 financial crisis have been 
lower than those in the US, UK and Germany, and losses to bank assets and GDP 
have been far lower than a range of additional European countries, including the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland (Table 3).4 Moreover, French banks needed far 
less government support to cope with the crisis than the banks in these other countries. 
At the same time, France was far worse hit than the financial systems of Southern 
Europe – which, prior the onslaught of the euro area sovereign debt crisis, were 
widely upheld as amongst the most stable in Europe. French bank losses were on an 
unprecedented scale: total write-downs for the 2007-2010 period for the five largest 
banks reached US$72.4bn (Reuters 2011). Table 4 sets out French bank losses from 
2007 to 2010 and the announced areas of those losses, sourced from the banks’ reports 
and accounts. The data are possibly partial because they show what the banks have 
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deemed material enough to highlight. However, they are very likely to highlight the 
main areas of loss. 
 
<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
         
The information about bank losses points to important features of French bank 
liberalization and investment banking activities which will be linked back to state 
intervention in the analysis below. Notably, the crisis affected both commercial and 
mutual banks alike. Mutual banks are majority-owned by their depositors and, at least 
in principle, operated for their benefit, rather than, as with the listed commercial 
banks, for the benefit of private shareholders. Given their more limited exposure to 
commercial pressures, many observers were taken by surprise by their losses (Hardie 
and Howarth 2009). Two mutual banks, Banques Populaires and the Caisse d’Epargne 
were badly affected through the difficulties faced by their common investment 
banking arm, Natixis, and merged in 2010 to form BPCE. Crédit Agricole, the part 
mutual bank, suffered significant losses, notably through its investment banking arm, 
Calyon (renamed Crédit Agricole CIB in 2010), which was badly exposed to US 
subprime. These losses demonstrate the shift in mutual bank operations that took 
place in the decade prior to the financial crisis.  
 
However, the figures also show that individual French banks were in good shape 
comparatively. In terms of total write-downs, the biggest French loser, BNP-Paribas, 
was (at the end of 2010) in sixteenth place globally and in distant seventh place in 
Europe (Reuters 2011). The two largest French commercial banks – BNP-Paribas and 
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Société Générale – and Crédit Agricole – reported profits in both 2008 and 2009, with 
each suffering only one quarter loss during the two year period despite rising write-
downs in 2009. The persistently high French bank leverage ratios (assets / shareholder 
equity) suggest a weak capital position (an average of 46 in 2010, well above the 
European average of 35) (Crédit Suisse 2010) and a high potential exposure to the 
financial crisis. However, these concerns over the leverage of French banks were 
mitigated by their comparatively strong tier-1 capital ratio (Crédit Suisse 2010; 
Financial Times, 23 July 2010). French banks were exposed to the secondary effects 
of the financial crisis both due to domestic write-downs caused by slow domestic 
economic growth and through their portfolio of international loans and government 
sovereign debt. French banks were heavily exposed to several euro area countries 
more at risk of default – notably the Southern European countries – and thus the 
impact of a traditional banking crisis. Much of the exposure in Italy and Greece owes 
to the expansion of retail banking activities in those two countries, an important 
feature of French bank internationalization.5 The euro area sovereign debt crisis, 
which intensified in 2010 and 2011, thus created new dangers for the largest French 
banks, an examination of which is beyond the scope of this article. 
 
How Gallic ‘market-based banking’ limited the impact of the crisis on France 
 
French banks and government officials claim that the large retail banking businesses 
and diversified operations of the French banks – that is, their ‘balanced business 
model’ – lessened the overall impact of the crisis. Retail banking continued to 
dominate domestic banking activities with over three-quarters of total domestically-
held bank financial assets throughout the 2000s (Table 5). Retail bank lending (both 
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domestic and international) declined significantly as a percentage of the total bank 
financial assets between 2000 and 2007. Retail lending nonetheless increased 
significantly in total terms at both the domestic and international levels (Table 5). The 
internationalization of French banking contained an important retail element (see also 
Table 6). In comparison, the internationalization of German and British banking was 
almost exclusively in corporate lending and investment banking (on Germany see 
Hackethal 2004, 77; on the UK see Hardie and Maxfield 2011). The 
internationalization of French bank assets and liabilities increased significantly in the 
decade prior to the crisis. However, this internationalization remained moderate 
compared to other large banking systems at just over 30 per cent of the total for both 
assets and liabilities and 100 per cent of GDP (2007 figures).6  
 
<TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
<TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Despite the comparative importance of retail banking and the comparatively limited 
internationalization of assets and liabilities, French banks were still heavily engaged 
in market-based banking. Indeed, by two measures – reliance on loans and deposits as 
a percentage of, respectively, total assets and liabilities, the French banking system 
was one of the most market-based on the planet (Figure 2) and had moved furthest 
from the ‘traditional’ model of banking of deposit taking and lending. It is necessary 
to examine the patterns of French market-based banking in order to get a fuller picture 
of the limited impact of the financial crisis on French banks. 
 
<FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
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Assets. The trading activity of French banks and, in particular, the use of derivatives 
in trading activities increased rapidly in the decade leading to the crisis (Table 7). 
Taking the banking system at large, financial assets held for trading exceeded both 
German and UK levels in 2008 (38 per cent versus 34.5 and 36.7 per cent) (ECB 
Statistical Data Warehouse). French banks specialised in equity, interest and exchange 
rate derivatives. Over the two decades prior to the crisis, French banks consistently 
engaged in approximately a quarter of global equity derivatives trading (Fédération 
Bancaire de France, 2007). For several years (2003-2007) Société Générale was one 
of the world’s leading traders of equity derivatives and for five years running (2003-
07) reported more profits from equity derivatives trading than any other bank 
globally. Earnings growth from these business lines mitigated the impulse to extend 
into credit derivatives (securitization) to the same extent as UK, US or even, German 
banks and thus decreased the relative exposure of French banks to the immediate 
effects of the financial crisis which hit hard trading in asset-backed securities (ABS), 
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), collateralized debt obligations (CDO) and 
credit default swaps (CDS). 
 
Yet some French banks were also heavily involved in the forms of market-based 
banking that were most linked to the financial crisis. Crédit Agricole, through its 
investment bank Calyon, was the world’s sixth largest trader of CDOs (Barnett-Hart 
2009: 19; with figures from Credit Rating Agencies), more than any European bank 
apart from UBS and more than several of the largest US investment banks combined.7 
Two French banks were heavy traders in CDS. When the recipients of collateral 
postings for CDS by the American insurance giant, AIG (using US government 
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support) were revealed, Société Générale headed the list, receiving US$11bn, 22 per 
cent of the total. Calyon, the Crédit Agricole subsidiary, received a further US$2.3bn. 
Named UK and German banks received less than their French counterparts, 
respectively, US$12.7bn and US$7.7bn. Luck therefore helped to diminish the impact 
of the financial crisis on French banks. The decision by the US Federal Government 
to bail-out AIG meant that French bank losses were considerably lower than they 
could have been. 
 
<TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Liabilities. On the funding side, French banks relied more on wholesale markets than 
banks in most other European countries (59.4 per cent of total liabilities in 2007, see 
Figure 3). The high level of French bank trading activities explains this heavy 
dependence on wholesale funds.  
 
<FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
 
As with the assets-side of the balance sheet, it is necessary to enter into the details on 
French bank liabilities to explain the comparatively limited impact of the financial 
crisis on French bank funding. French banks were less exposed to funding through off 
balance sheet SIVs and Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) vehicles than banks 
in several other countries (Financial Intermediation Research Society 2008).8 Banks 
were forced to bring these vehicles onto their balance sheet at the time of the financial 
crisis and find liquid funds to cover them. Globally, French banks were the fifth 
largest issuers of ABCP. However, liquidity support to ABCP vehicles9 in France 
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reached only US$90.66bn in 2007 or 3.5 per cent of GDP, far lower than in those 
European countries most affected by the crisis (Table 8). Twelve of the fourteen 
largest French banks did not sponsor ABCP vehicles at all.10 Further, the limited 
securitization of bank lending in France diminished the effects of the financial crisis 
on the supply of credit which increased in the years following the financial crisis.11 
Outstanding collateral in securitizations at the end of 2008 was only 1.4 per cent of 
GDP in France – one of the lowest levels in Western Europe – compared to 3.5 in 
Germany, over 10 per cent in Italy, over 20 per cent in Spain and over 30 per cent in 
the UK.12 The figure for ABCP Collateral is 0.8 per cent of French GDP versus 4 per 
cent for the UK. Unlike in the UK, the Netherlands and even Spain, securitization was 
not crucial to the rise of French bank lending in the 2000s. 
 
<TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE> 
 
The sources of French bank funding help to explain their relative stability in the 
context of the financial crisis. French banks financed themselves through debt 
securities more than the banks in more exposed European countries (€984bn 
outstanding versus the UK’s €553bn) (although much less than Germany’s €1638bn) 
(ECB Statistical Data Warehouse). French bank debt was of a much lower maturity by 
euro area standards, with 36.6 per cent up to a year in 2007 compared to German 
figures of 3.8 per cent.13 French banks were thus potentially exposed to the difficulties 
of refinancing given the market conditions following the collapse of Lehman brothers. 
However, refinancing was made easier because “French banks' net foreign position 
(foreign claims minus foreign liabilities) was almost entirely denominated in euros, 
which could be financed directly by domestic sources. … UK, Swiss, German and 
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Dutch banks built up large net foreign positions denominated in US dollars” (BIS 
CGFS 2010, 1).14 This was largely a reflection of the comparatively limited exposure 
of French banks to the dollar-denominated securities of US banks, which is explained 
below. French bank funding relied less on short term interbank lending and 
considerably less on interbank lending from beyond the euro area and, specifically, 
from US banks – which froze up during the financial crisis – than funding in several 
other European countries. Only about a quarter (25.6 per cent in 2007) of French 
interbank lending came from beyond the euro area, compared to over half (51.7 per 
cent) for the Netherlands (Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data). 
 
How declining state intervention shaped Gallic ‘market-based banking’ 
 
French banks were engaged in many of the same market-based banking activities as 
British and German banks. However, French banks were far smaller investors in the 
assets that became toxic (notably financial products based on American sub-prime 
mortgages), less involved in setting up off balance sheet vehicles, relative to their 
size, less engaged in the securitization of lending and less reliant on short-term 
interbank lending. These features of French banking can in part be explained in terms 
of bank strategy – some aspects of which are specific to individual banks. However, 
most of these features are broadly similar to all or most of the largest French banks 
(both the mutual and commercial banks) and should be described as systemic. They 
can ultimately be traced back to government policy:  deliberate state efforts to build 
the French financial system in the 1980s and 1990s, strategy on national champions 
and explicit and implicit forms of protectionism. 
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The liberalization of the French financial system since the mid-1980s has been 
substantial. All French banks were subject to the same broad legal framework, 
adopted in 1984, which allowed them to become universal banks. Prior to 1987, all 
the largest French banks were state-owned. With the privatizations of 1987 – 2002, 
four of the largest French banks – Société Générale, Banque Nationale de Paris 
(BNP), the now defunct Crédit Lyonnais and Crédit Commercial de France – became 
fully commercial operations, listed on the French stock exchange, the CAC-40. BNP’s 
take-over of Paribas, an investment bank, in 1999, further expanded its trading 
activities. However, the comparative strength of all these banks remained in retail. 
Several others, most importantly Crédit Agricole, opted to become non-listed mutual 
banks, owned by smaller regional cooperative banks.15 Three of the six largest French 
banks were mutuals (and one part-mutual in the case of Crédit Agricole) and engaged 
principally in retail banking. The late arrival of the mutuals to investment banking 
(starting in 1999) may explain the difficulties faced by their investment banking arms 
– and Calyon’s heavy exposure to CDOs – given the push to expand rapidly. 
However, the retail focus of Natixis’ and Calyon’s parent mutual banks limited the 
overall damage. German Landesbanken (LB), the publicly owned regional banks, did 
not have this retail focus which explains why their expansion owed more to 
investment banking activities to which they similarly came late (Hardie and Howarth 
2009). Further, the two French commercial banks and Crédit Agricole were also big 
and listed (and thus could issue equity to fund foreign acquisitions) an option 
unavailable to the German LB and banks in some smaller European countries. 
 
The ‘balanced model’ of French banking – and the relative importance of retail – can 
in part be explained by regulatory constraints. By the 2000s, French regulation was far 
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less restrictive of investment banking than in some European countries, notably Spain 
or Italy, where regulation made it prohibitively expensive for banks to create off 
balance sheet vehicles (Royo 2008). All French banks were encouraged by French 
governments to engage in a full range of investment banking activities, including off 
balance sheet securitization. Further, French banks were able to avoid building capital 
reserves in line with assumed risks. Neither the Basle II capital adequacy 
requirements and the EU capital requirement directive nor domestic legislation 
addressed this issue (Bank of France officials 29 January 2008; Banking Commission 
officials 9 December 2009). By the mid-2000s, World Bank indicators gave France 
comparatively low scores in measures of ‘capital stringency’ (2, with 5 being the 
highest score assigned) and of ‘restrictions’ imposed on banks’ activities (6, with 14 
being the highest score assigned). Italy in comparison is assigned a 4 and a 9 and the 
so-called ‘light touch’ regime of the UK a 3 and a 5 (Laeven and Levine 2008; data 
from Barth, Caprio and Laeven 2006).  
 
However, the history of French regulation on securitization and off balance sheet 
activities helps to explain comparatively limited usage. The French state actively 
encouraged banks to engage in securitization, starting with the creation of a legislative 
framework in 1988 which was intended to boost confidence in the financial technique 
by creating clear legal, accounting and tax rules, unlike the UK which opted for a 
laisser-faire approach (Baum 1994). The official aim of the French Treasury at the 
time was to help French banks cope with new BIS solvency ratio guidelines and EC 
rules (Directive no. 89/647, Solvency I) set to come into force at the start of 1993. The 
French state also wanted to support the international competitiveness of French banks 
and was concerned that British banks and American banks based in London would 
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dominate securitization in Europe (Baum 1994, International Securitisation Report 
1993). Securitization would give French banks access to the same funding options 
available to American and British competitors, in order to replace traditional funding 
sources, such as retail deposits and commercial paper, the costs of which were rising 
in the 1980s. Further, French governments saw in securitization a mechanism to 
increase lending to NFCs, especially medium-sized companies. Securitization, 
however, took off only slowly due in part to the intentional and unintentional 
technical, legal and financial obstacles in the 1988 legislation (Baum 1994), which 
limited the types of assets that could be securitized and created disincentives through 
rigid bankruptcy provisions that stemmed from existing French law. These obstacles 
were only gradually and partially eliminated over the next decade – the result being 
more limited securitization than in most other West European countries (relative to 
banking activities) into the 2000s. A significant part of the problem was the 
application to securitization of existing French investor protection rules – notably 
lengthy procedures and safeguards in the creation of SIVs – and accounting rules 
which discouraged off balance sheet securitization into the 2000s. French 
governments pushed through a series of legislative changes starting in 1993 to 
facilitate securitization (Touraine & Gillo 2004; Ministry of Finance officials, 
interview, 20 October) with significant changes in 2003 (Doat & Nugue 2005) and as 
recently as 2008 (Burnat 2009).   
 
Limited French government success in encouraging banks to increase their 
engagement in securitization owes in large part to the success of state action 
encouraging other forms of financial innovation. In particular, the French state 
encouraged the trading of equity, interest rate and exchange rate derivatives, on which 
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French investment banking became more heavily reliant than banking in other 
European countries. In February 1986, the Socialist government established the 
French futures market, the MATIF, and appointed a senior Treasury official and 
financial inspector, Gérard de la Martinière, to run it. The MATIF served several 
purposes (Mamou 1988; Story and Walter 1998). It provided market-enabling 
institutional investors to hedge against the risk of volatile interest or exchange rates. It 
represented France’s response to the creation of the London-based LIFFE in 1982. It 
brought the Paris market into the world web of futures markets. Above all, the 
MATIF was a central element in modernising issuance of state paper. All its major 
derivative products originated with the Treasury. The French state floated a long-term 
ECU contract in October 1990 with the specific aim of developing Paris as the centre 
for trade in ECUs, the euro’s predecessor. Paris rapidly became the second market for 
futures in Europe and by the early 1990s, the MATIF was engaged in trading levels 
that were only marginally lower than the LIFFE. In 1987, Société Générale started 
derivatives trading within two months of being the first state-owned bank privatised. 
The rapid expansion of bank trading activities in the decade leading up to the crisis 
(Table 7) both reflects the saturation of domestic markets and the relative strength of 
French investment banking. 
 
Other forms of state intervention help explain the retail focus of the French banking 
system and bank internationalization. Government legislation strongly affected the 
composition and allocation of a large part of financial savings through numerous 
schemes to mobilize and direct savings and credit towards programs judged to be in 
the public interest. These schemes encompassed certain controls on interest rates and 
fees, the design by the government of various savings products (notably the Livret A), 
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the centralization of about a quarter of bank deposits in a fund managed by the state-
owned Caisse des dépôts et consignations (CDC), restrictions on the use of funds 
collected through some savings products, and significant differences in tax treatment 
between financial products. In 2003, about 80 per cent of bank deposits (including 
checking accounts) were subject to significant product and/or price prescriptions, and 
differences in tax treatment have steered household savings towards life insurance 
products and saving for house purchases (IMF 2004). Amongst other effects, these 
policies distorted competition in the banking sector by restricting the distribution of 
certain products with only certain institutions, notably the public sector or mutual 
banks, allowed to offer specific tax-exempt or high rate savings products, thus placing 
commercial banks, both domestic and foreign, at a competitive disadvantage (Candida 
2000). For example, the Post Office and two mutual banks, Crédit Mutuel and Caisse 
d’Epargne, were alone allowed to maintain the tax-exempt Livret A — until the start 
of 2009 from when all banks could offer this savings vehicle.16 Fiscal policy thus 
unintentionally contributed to the retail-focus of the French mutual banks, a highly 
saturated domestic retail market, into which few foreign banks entered,17 and a strong 
retail component to French bank internationalization – the saturated domestic market 
forced French banks to expand internationally. The kind of protectionism that 
persisted in Germany was markedly different. German Lander governments continued 
to provide guarantees to the LB until 2005 and the LB and Sparkassen continued to 
operate in what were, in effect, fiefdoms closed to other public sector banks. The 
comparison of French and German protectionism is revealing. French protectionism 
encouraged domestic retail activities, resulted in the saturation of the domestic market 
and retail expansion abroad. German protectionism created a moral hazard for 
German public banks to invest actively in ABS created by American banks.  
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In the 1980s and 90s, French conservative governments encouraged the emergence of 
a limited number of large, vertically integrated banking groups controlled by French 
corporate shareholders – in a complex network of cross-shareholding with national 
firms, both to improve the stability of the system and to foster national champions – 
and a reflection of longstanding industrial strategy (Cohen 1995; Hayward 1995; 
Schmidt 1996). In response to increasing international and domestic competitive 
pressures, economic recession and sluggish growth from 1993, there was considerable 
concentration in the French banking sector, with eight of the largest banks created (or 
transformed) as the result of mergers (often steered by the French state) from 1995 to 
2004 (Fédération bancaire française 2009).18 The French banking system became one 
of the most concentrated in the EU. Figures from 2007 show that the five largest 
French banks had 51.8 per cent of total assets, compared to 22 per cent in Germany, 
33 per cent in Italy, 41 per cent in the UK and 41 per cent in Spain (ECB 2008).  By 
the late 1990s, four French banks were in the top 15 European banks by asset size.  
 
Morin (2000: 37) describes the France of the 1980s and 1990s as a ‘financial network 
economy’. The French government aimed to emulate the long-standing German 
practice of cross-shareholding networks, centring these around the then three largest 
commercial banks (BNP, Société Générale and the now defunct Crédit Lyonnais) and 
the insurance giant AXA – a central feature of the national champion strategy. The 
state retained, indirectly, part ownership through the Caisse des dépôts et 
consignations (CDC), the para-statal financial institution that manages state pensions, 
and NFCs part-owned by the state. The ‘hard core’ concept reserved 25 per cent of 
privatised firms’ capital to major bank or corporate shareholders, selected by the state. 
 20 
The expectation was that the state would be able to manipulate this ‘hard core’ to 
influence strategic management decisions and block takeovers by foreign banks. Most 
of the largest banks were directed by former ministry of finance officials, advisers to 
the finance minister and, in several cases, members of the financial inspectorate, the 
elite network – grand corps – of financial sector administrators (Schmidt 1996; 
Maclean, Harvey and Press 2001). ‘Security and market transparency’ legislation 
adopted in 1989 strengthened the Commission des Operations du Bourse to protect 
companies against hostile takeovers by other companies by forcing owners of over 33 
per cent of a listed company’s shares to make a bid for at least 66 per cent of shares. 
Despite increased competition among French banks, the government also encouraged 
the practice of ‘interbancarité’, with cooperation amongst the biggest banks through 
an electronic banking card system (Story and Walter 1998). The minitel information 
system, developed by the state-owned telecommunication monopoly, France Télécom, 
enabled French banks to access households directly, over fifteen years prior to the 
advent of internet banking in other countries (Le Monde, 22 October 1992). Thus 
while no explicit law blocked foreign take-overs of banks, throughout the 1990s it 
was widely believed that no French government would sell a privatised bank to 
foreigners and that the state would also step in to block foreign firms from taking too 
large a shareholding of the listed banks. The decision by the Socialist-led Jospin 
Government to allow the London-based HSBC to take over the regional branches of 
France’s seventh largest bank Crédit Commercial de France (CCF) in 2000 could be 
seen as a sign of changing government attitudes (Le Monde, 4 April 2000). However, 
no other French bank has since been taken over by a foreign bank and in 2008 
Banques Populaires bought these branches back from HSBC. 
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There is a caveat to this picture of a protectionist French banking system. Within a 
few years of privatization the cross-shareholding networks began to unravel and 
foreign control of the largest national banks increased (Culpepper 2005; Clift 2007; 
Maclean, Harvey and Press 2001). Although French banks dominated the domestic 
banking system, the actual equity ownership of the two large commercial banks 
became increasingly foreign owned in the 1990s and 2000s. In 2002, foreigners 
owned 67 per cent of BNP-Paribas’ equity capital and 50.8 per cent of Société 
Générale’s. The two large French commercial banks were similar to other EU 
commercial banks in this regard with rapidly rising foreign ownership in the 1990s 
and 2000s.19 Despite the decline in cross-shareholding portfolios, important features 
of the ‘financial network economy’ remained (Dudouet & Grémont 2010; Clift 
2011b), including shareholding pacts as between BNP Paribas and AXA. French 
mutual banks mostly did not open their capital, but Crédit Agricole – one of the 
largest retail banks in Europe – was partially opened to private shareholding in 2001. 
The actual impact of rising foreign ownership on bank operations is hard to isolate. 
Nevertheless, this opening and partial breakdown of cross-shareholding in French 
banks – and thus the decline of an important form of patient capital (Culpepper 2005) 
– is a likely influence on the pursuit of increased profits through more aggressive 
strategies including investment banking. Sluggish economic growth in France over 
much of the decade prior to the financial crisis encouraged expansion abroad. The 
relationship of French banks with NFCs – never as close as in Germany – became 
more distant (Bertero, 1994; O’Sullivan, 2007) as elements of the ‘financial network’ 
economy deteriorated (Morin, 1998, 2000). The importance of bank finance for 
French companies – especially the largest CAC-40 listed companies – declined 
dramatically in the 1980s and 90s, and large French banks compensated by expanding 
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retail operations abroad and by developing investment banking activities (Bank of 
France officials 29 January 2008).  
 
To conclude, French banks operated as profit-maximisers and pursued domestic and 
international expansion. However, the manner in which they did this was dictated by 
conditions in the French banking system established to a large extent deliberately by 
the French state. State efforts in actively prodding recently privatised banks to engage 
in derivatives trading and securitization also point to the relevance of work by 
scholars who highlight continued but more limited forms of state intervention to cope 
with contemporary challenges in global capitalism – in addition to Schmidt (2003, 
2009), see Levy (2006) and Ben Clift’s (2011a; 2011b) elaboration on post-dirigisme. 
French government efforts to facilitate financial innovation fit well with Chris 
Howell’s (2009) ‘paradox of French state intervention’ which suggests that the French 
state is engaged in new kinds of state activism – but that the upshot of this activism is 
a retreat from interventionism in the economy, and the increasing exposure of the 
institutions of the French economy to international market forces.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has sought to explain how French state intervention resulted in the limited 
but significant impact of the international financial crisis on the French banking 
system. The rise of market-based banking significantly changed the country’s 
financial system over the past two decades, notably through the substantial rise in 
derivatives trading in the 2000-7 period. However, retail banking remained important 
both at home and in international operations. The strong retail component to French 
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bank internationalization is in marked contrast to the internationalization of German 
and British banks which had, on average, far greater exposure to securitized assets and 
liabilities. For Italian and Spanish banks, meanwhile, internationalization was largely 
about the expansion of international retail banking activities (IMF, 2006a&b; Quaglia, 
2009; Royo, 2009), even though their engagement in securitization was, on average, 
at a higher level than French banks. 
 
The 2007-09 crisis did not bring substantial changes to the French banking system and 
even encouraged certain trends. The scaling down of some trading activities amidst 
the rhetoric of governments and many banks themselves for a necessary ‘return’ to 
traditional banking activities represents a time-honoured, and most likely time-
limited, response to business problems (Financial Times, 10 September 2008). A 
retreat to the more cautious nationally-oriented banking of the past was highly 
unlikely in all but the very short term: the opportunities in domestic markets were 
limited and the lure of profits in risk-taking connected to derivatives trading remained. 
French banks – commercial and mutual – sought to expand their foreign retail and 
trading operations in order to increase profitability after the lean years of the mid-
1990s. The result was record levels of profits for all six of the largest banks in the 
2003-7 period. 
 
Soft forms of protectionism and limited foreign penetration remained features. The 
upswing in state intervention as a result of the crisis was temporary. The state 
emerged as a substantial shareholder, in the case of BNP-Paribas the largest, but 
without voting rights. These shares were bought back by the banks in 2009 and 2010. 
The state-led merger of Caisse d’Epargne and Banques Populaires appears something 
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of a throw-back to state interventionism. However, despite government rhetoric to the 
contrary, there was no state involvement in the micromanagement of the new bank. 
Rather the merger should be seen as an opportunistic move to further concentrate the 
banking system.20  
 
There was no significant overhaul of French regulatory and supervisory regimes that 
by 2008 provided full support to market-based banking, encouraging off balance sheet 
activities and other financial innovations made difficult in the banking systems of 
Southern Europe. The domestic regulatory response to the worst financial crisis 
affecting French banks since the Second World War was negligible (Hardie and 
Howarth 2009). The Bank of France and the government repeatedly challenged the 
assumptions behind ‘Too big to fail’ concerns (Noyer 2010; Financial Times, 16 
November 2009). BNP-Paribas – actively supported by the French government in its 
take-over of Dexia and Fortis’ Belgian and Luxembourg operations (Hardie and 
Howarth 2009) – became the largest bank in the world by assets, recording an 
increase of 34 per cent in three years. While the financial crisis resulted in a retreat in 
the international activities of British and German banking activities, the 
internationalization of French banking, principally in retail operations, proceeded 
apace.21 
 
Over the twenty years prior to the international financial crisis that erupted in 2007, 
French governments repeatedly sought to facilitate securitization. However, the 
French state was more successful in encouraging banks to develop other operations – 
which resulted in the downplaying of securitization and the construction of a 
‘balanced business model’ which buffered French banks from the full impact of the 
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crisis. The French state deliberately – and very successfully – encouraged derivatives 
trading through the creation of the MATIF and through Treasury issues. Ironically, it 
was the failure of repeated state efforts to facilitate securitization – in part due to well-
rooted regulation that effectively hindered this form of financial innovation – that 
helped to shelter France from the financial crisis. Deliberate state efforts – reflecting a 
long-standing ‘national champions’ strategy – resulted in the construction of a small 
number of large French banks with a strong retail base and international retail 
presence – the unintentional consequence of which was to create a buffer for French 
banks facing significant losses due to the financial crisis. This construction of large 
retail-focused national champions was helped by a lingering protectionism that 
contributed to a highly saturated and foreign-bank unfriendly domestic retail market. 
Clearly, a crucial transformation in French political economy remains the move to a 
‘financial market’ form of capitalism, as large and many medium-sized NFCs turned 
increasingly to the equity markets (often foreign) for finance and French banks looked 
abroad and to other activities to compensate (Morin, 1998, 2000). The drive of French 
banks to expand, with foreign equity issues and forms of market-based banking, 
contributed to the unravelling of the cross-shareholding groups created in the 1980s 
and 90s and centred around the largest commercial banks. This article does not deny 
the importance of bank or NFC agency in reshaping the French financial system 
(Culpepper 2005; O’Sullivan 2007). However, state action played a crucial and 
largely deliberate role in shaping the French bank business model, internationalization 
and the peculiarities of French market-based banking. 
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Notes 
                                                
1 France has also been described as a Mixed Market Economy (MME) along with 
Southern European forms of capitalism, but this is a broad category containing 
considerable institutional variety (Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher 2007). 
2 The French financial system remains considerably smaller than the British owing to 
the comparatively limited development of other financial market actors (including 
hedge funds). 
3 As a percentage of total financial assets, equity rose from 3.7 per cent in 1980 (a 
third of UK levels) to 21 per cent in 2000 (just short of British levels at 24.1 per cent). 
Equity market capitalization as a percentage of GDP can fluctuate significantly. The 
figures used (from 2000 and 2007) represent peaks: the relative size of bank assets 
was larger between these years.  
4 One international comparison (Xiao 2009; IMF 2009, p. 15) on the direct cost of the 
crisis for large international banks shows that the direct cost for French banks (to 
April 2009) was about 18 per cent of Tier 1 capital, lower than that of Germany 
(about 33 per cent), the U.K. (about 37 per cent), the U.S. (about 86 per cent), and 
Switzerland (about 87 per cent). 
5 Total French bank exposure to the so-called PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and 
Spain) reached €334.8bn in 2010 (BIS, December 2010). French banks were the most 
heavily exposed to Greece (€67.8) and the second most exposed to Spain. French 
banks were also the most exposed to Italy at €336.3bn (end September 2010 figures, 
BIS). 
6 The internationalization of British assets and liabilities was far higher at well over 
60 per cent of the total for both and 250 per cent of GDP. German internationalized 
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assets were at 55 per cent of the total and at a similar level of GDP (ECB Statistical 
Data Warehouse). 
7 Calyon issued more CDOs than Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, 
Morgan Stanley or JP Morgan. 
8 See Hardie and Howarth (2011) for a further discussion of off balance sheet 
activities with regard to banks. 
9 Liquidity support to ABCP vehicles shows the exposure of a country’s banks to 
being forced to accept assets fully onto their balance sheets, with capital and liquidity 
implications, as a result of ABCP funding being unavailable.  
10 Société Générale and Natixis were exposed to a total of US$0.72bn and US$2.82bn 
of ABCP respectively and only Natixis suffered major losses in ABCP. In contrast 
more British and German large banks sponsored ABCP vehicles (5 out of 11 and 14 
out of 25, respectively) (Arteta, Carey, Correa and Kotter 2010). 
11 In 2007, French banks lent a total of €764.7 billion to NFCs in the euro area with 
lending figures rising annually to €877.5 billion in 2011 (ECB figures). 
12 Author’s calculations from European Securitization Forum figures, available at 
www.afme.eu/document.aspx?id=2878, accessed 8 November 2010. 
13 ECB figures: 
http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/aggregates/bsheets/html/outstanding_amounts_2007-
12.en.html, accessed 17 November 2010. 
14 The euro denominated net foreign position owed to limited French bank exposure to 
US assets (including securities) and the euro area focus of French bank 
internationalization. 
15 Crédit Agricole was later part-listed on the CAC-40 stock exchange. 
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16 A significant part of the Livret A financed social housing (and was placed on the 
balance sheet of the CDC) and thus did not constitute a resource for other banking 
activities. Nonetheless, the Livret A effectively distorted competition in retail banking. 
17 In 2008, France was in fourth place in the EU for the number of branches per capita 
(ECB 2008). French owned credit institutions held 85 per cent of bank-held assets 
throughout the 2000s (IMF, 2004, 103; IMF, 2009, 44). This was lower than some 
parochial continental European banking systems – domestic banks controlled 92.8 per 
cent of bank assets in Spain (December 2005) (IMF 2006b) – but far below the 
foreign presence in the British banking sector, reaching up to 55.2 per cent in 2005 
(ECB 2010). 
18 The number of French credit institutions declined from 1556 in 1984 to only 959 by 
2003 and 450 by 2008 (Fédération Bancaire de France, 2009). 
19 For example, Deutsche bank, the largest German bank, was foreign-owned at 55 per 
cent in 2007, while the second largest Spanish commercial bank, BBVA, was foreign-
owned at 45 per cent in 2008. See Deutsche Bank. 2010. “Shareholder Structure.” 
Available at  http://www.deutsche-bank.de/ir/en/content/shareholder_structure.htm 
20 By 2008 only 415 banks (715 credit institutions) continued to operate in the country 
down from 481 (975) in 2002 (Fédération Bancaire de France, 2009; IMF 2009). 
21 The non-French financial assets (loans, securities, shares and other financial 
products combined) held by French monetary financial institutions rose from 36.4 per 
cent of total financial assets at the end of 2007 to 38.1 per cent at the end of 2010. See 
Banque de France. ‘Statistiques monétaires mensuelles : France, Bilan des Institutions 
Financières et Monétaires hors Banque de France (encours)’. Available at 
http://www.banque-
france.fr/fr/statistiques/base/statmon/html/tmf_mens_france_fr_bilifmhbdfe.htm. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: National Financial Systems, Selected Countries (2000 and 2007)  
Bank assets, Private debt market, Equity market capitalisation as a percentage of total 
financial system assets. 
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Sources: For credit institution assets see ECB 2004 and 2008. For Private bond 
market and equity market capitalisation see Thortsen Beck and Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, 
"Financial Institutions and Markets Across Countries and over Time: Data and 
Analysis." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4943, May 2009. For 
Equity market capitalisation see also World bank data bank: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=3&id=4 
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Figure 2: Loans to Assets and Deposits to Liabilities, Selected Countries, end 
2007. 
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Sources: Hardie and Howarth 2011; ECB 
(www.ecb.int/stats/money/consolidated/html/index.en.html); Cabinet Office 2008; 
Federal Reserve (www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm); IMF 
2010: 16. 
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Figure 3: Breakdown of Bank Liabilities, Selected Countries, end 2007.  
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Sources: Hardie and Howarth 2011; ECB (Authors’ calculations from: 
http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/aggregates/bsheets/html/outstanding_amounts_2007-
12.en.html); IMF 2010: 16.  
 
Tables 
 
Table 1:  NFC finance 1970s to 2000 
 Bank lending Debt securities Equity (listed and 
unlisted)21 
1978-84 average* 67.4 3.5 29.1 
2000** 16.1 3.4 79 
Source:  1978-84 figures from Cobham and Serre 2000, 49; 2000 figures from Byrne 
and Davis 2002, 89. 
*The NFCs do not include state-owned companies and public utilities. The total figure 
covers only lending, bonds and equity, excluding trade credits and other sources of 
external finance. 
**The remaining 1.4 per cent consists of monetary market instruments. 
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Table 2: Finance raised by French NFCs since 1990 (outstanding, €bn) 
Funds by source* 
/ date (end of 
year) 
Bank loans from 
domestic credit 
institutions only 
Debt securities 
(in all 
currencies 
combined) 
Equities (listed 
only) 
1990 440.6 101.1 206.2 
1995 441.5 134.1 308.4 
2000 507.3 233.1 1235.3 
2005 579.6 279.3 1119 
2006 630.5 280.1 1379.2 
2007 713.3 275 1501.1 
2008 781.6 295.9 891.7 
2009 769.3 345.9  1080.2 
Source:  ‘Loans : Banque de France, Credit Institution Credits to NFCs.’ Available 
online at http://www.banque-
france.fr/fr/statistiques/base/statmon/telnomot/mh.m.ec.credit.3.r.1b.to.t.m.x.b.x.csv. 
Securities and equity, ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. 
 
Table 3: Write downs and public support for banks, Selected countries, July 
2007 to July 2010. 
 Bel. Fr. Ger. Italy Japan Nld
s 
Sp UK US 
Securities 
Write 
downs as 
a % total 
bank 
assets 
(2007) 
0.44 
(08-
09 
only) 
0.38 
(7.07 
to 
4.10 
only) 
2 .086% 
(07-09 
only) 
.22%, 
(April 
2009 
est.) 
1.8 0.17  0.52 2.6 
Public 
funds 
drawn 
upon by 
banks (% 
2007 
GDP) by 
end 2009 
6 1.1 4.9 0.3 0.2 2.5 1.1 6.5 4.8 
Sources:  National Central Banks, ‘Financial Stability Report’ and IMF ‘Global 
Financial Stability Report, April / October 2010 for figures on securities write-downs 
and public funds drawn.  
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Table 4: French Bank Losses, 2007-2010 
 Total 
Write-
downs 
2007-
2010 
($ US) 
Write-
downs 
2007-
2010 / 
Total 
Assets 
(at 
end 
2007)  
per 
cent 
CDO
/ 
MBS 
LBO Mono-
line* 
ABCP 
/ SIV 
Other 
Trad-
ing 
Iceland/ 
Lehman
/ 
Washin
gton 
 Mutual 
BNP-
Paribas  
28.3 1.67 X X X  X X 
Société 
Générale 
18.6 1.74 X  X    
Crédit 
Agricole 
18.6 1.32 X  X  X  
Crédit 
Mutuel 
N/A N/A X    X X 
Caisse 
d’Epargne 
Share 
of 
Natixis  
6.9 
N/A X  X X X X 
Banques 
Populaires 
Share 
of 
Natixis  
6.9 
N/A X  X X X X 
Source: ‘FACTBOX-U.S., European bank writedowns, credit losses’, Reuters, 24 
February 2011. Available online at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/24/banks-
writedowns-losses-idUSLDE71N1J720110224. Reuters/annual reports/company 
filings/registration documents. Author’s own calculations. Estimates based on 
writedowns and losses from sub-prime securities, mortgages, CDOs, derivatives and 
SIVs, and losses on bad loans, or non-performing loans. 
* Exposure to insurance companies that provided guarantees for various types of 
securities. 
 
 
Table 5: (on additional document file, contact author at david.howarth@uni.lu) 
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Table 6: French Bank Internationalization (lending exposure) 
 
BNP-
Paribas 
Lending outside France rose from 61 per cent in 2001 to 65 per cent in 
2007. Lending business to the rest of the European Economic Area rose 
from 18 per cent of total in 2001 to 30 per cent in 2007. 
Société 
Générale 
Lending outside France rose from 35 per cent in 2003 to 50 per cent in 
2007. Exposure outside Europe rose from 10 per cent in 2003 to 19 per 
cent of total in 2007. 
Crédit 
Agricole 
Lending outside France rose from 18.4 per cent 2001 to 56.3 per cent in 
2007. Lending business in the rest of the EU increased from 4.9 per cent 
to 33.9 per cent.  Lending to the rest of the world increased from 14.5 
per cent in 2001 to 22.4 per cent. 
Source:  Bank registration documents.  Authors’ own calculations. 
 
 
Table 7: Increased Bank Trading Activity 
 
BNP-Paribas Trading assets 51.8 per cent of total assets in 2007 (14.2 per cent in 
2002). 
Société 
Générale 
Trading assets peaked at 31.9 per cent of total assets in 2006 (more 
than double 2002). Fall to 28.6 per cent in 2007. 
Crédit 
Agricole 
Trading assets 30.2 per cent of total assets in 2007. 
Caisse 
d’Epargne 
Trading assets 10.5 per cent of total assets in 2007. 
Crédit Mutuel Trading assets 13.8 per cent of total assets in 2008 (2007 not 
available). 
Source:  Bank registration documents; author’s own calculations.  
 
 
Table 8: Liquidity Support to ABCP vehicles by Country 
 
 Amount (US$bn) % of GDP 
Belgium 52.33 11.52 
France 90.66 3.5 
Germany 310.84 9.36 
Italy 2.72 0.13 
Netherlands 173.87 22.37 
Spain 7.08 0.49 
United Kingdom 214.25 7.75 
United States 356.83 2.58 
Source: Fitch Ratings (2007: 7-8); see also Acharya and Schnabl, 2010: 54 
 
